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1 Introduction  
1.1 The field of the research    
One of the most usual ways to engage the ship in trade is to contract her out on a basis of 
the charterparty agreement. There are different types of charterparty agreements known 
under English Law, however, more common are those where the crew is directly employed 
by the owner.1 That is time and voyage charterparty agreements. Usually, they are conclu-
ded on a standard contractual terms applicable to the particular trade with the certain 
amendments made by the parties to reflect their business needs. 
  
Generally speaking, a voyage charterparty is a contract under which the shipowner agrees 
to carry specified goods by sea from a specified port of loading to a specified port of dis-
charge upon paying of the freight.2 To simplify, the ship then would be chartered out for a 
specific voyage. 
  
In contrast, a time charterparty agreement is defined by a period of time, rather than a geo-
graphical voyage. Thus, upon the payment of the hire, the time charterer acquires the right 
to “exploit the earning capacity of the vessel”3. The effect of it is that the time charterer 
will become in charge of the economic employment of the ship and direct it to any place he 
finds reasonable, within the trading limits imposed by the contract. 
  
The main difference between time and voyage charterparty agreements, in fact, lies in this 
continuing right and obligation of the time charterer to give orders for the vessel’s 
                                                
 1	  “Charterparties,”	  in	  Southampton	  on	  Shipping	  Law,	  1st	  Edition,	  2008,	  200.	  2	  C.	  Debattista,	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  Carried	  by	  Sea,	  2nd	  ed.	  (London:	  Butterworths,	  1998).	  3	  Lord	  Hobhouse	  in	  Whistler	  International	  Ltd	  v	  Kawasaki	  Kisen	  Kaisha	  Ltd	  (The	  Hill	  Harmo-­‐
ny)	  [2001]	  1	  AC	  638	  at	  652	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employment.4 If to consider the “classic” voyage charterparty, no such right is given to the 
charterer even in terms of the nomination of the port of loading or discharge.5 
  
However, the modern trade has called for the flexibility of the voyage charterparties.6 The 
reason for that lies in the fact that in vast majority of cases, the voyage charterparty 
agreement is not merely a contract of affreightment, but one of the integral elements of the 
international contract of sale concluded on the shipment terms.7 In essence, it means that 
the voyage charterparty is stemming from the contract of sale which has a dominant posi-
tion: the transporting agreement would be framed in a way that enables the charterer to 
fulfill his obligations under the sale contract. 
  
The flexibility of the voyage charterparties, among others, relates to the ports of loading 
and discharge, or the places of loading and discharge within the concrete ports.8 This has 
been reflected in contemporary standard voyage charterparty terms that frequently give a 
voyage charterer a right to nominate a port. Although such flexibility gives a positive im-
pact on the business efficiency, it also imposes the additional obligations on the parties to 
the voyage charter.9 To be precise, once the voyage charterer obtains the right to nominate 
a port, he has to make sure that this port is a safe one. Therefore, the concept of the safe 
port obligation has become a vital aspect of both time and voyage charterparty agreements. 
This concept is frequently referred to as the primary obligation to nominate the safe port or 
the safe port warranty. 
 
Although, the concept of safe port warranty might be seen as rather elastic at the first 
glance, the disputes on safe ports in vast majority of cases are hardly straightforward. This 
                                                
 4	  C.	  Debattista,	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  Carried	  by	  Sea.	  5	  The	  Evolving	  Law	  and	  Practice	  of	  Voyage	  Charterparties,	  Prof.	  D.	  Rhidian	  Thomas	  (London:	  Informa,	  2009),	  2.	  6	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al.,	  Voyage	  Charters,	  3rd	  Edition,	  2007,	  103–104.	  7	  For	  the	  deep	  evaluation	  on	  that	  matter	  see	  C.	  Debattista,	  Sale	  of	  Goods	  Carried	  by	  Sea.	  8	  The	  Evolving	  Law	  and	  Practice	  of	  Voyage	  Charterparties,	  2.	  9	  Ibid.	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might be explained by the fact that the safe port obligations sometimes interfere with other 
matters, such as the validity of nomination or voyage orders for instance, that are more 
complicated in their nature.  
 
The issues of safe port warranty have always been considered as those that require lengthy 
legal analysis in practise.10 This statement seems to be valid even today. In accordance with 
the recently published data, ship incidents at port have constituted the largest loss claims in 
the latest years.11 From this perspective, the matters of the safe port warranty should form a 
subject of charterers’ and shipowners’ interest. However, some authors claim that there is 
an obvious lack of accurate understanding of the warranty in question within the shipping 
industry.12  
 
Indeed, there are quite a few fundamental studies that analyse the nature and ambit of the 
safe port warranty.13 Notwithstanding the fact that those academic works provide a deep 
examination of the charterer’s responsibility towards the safe port obligation, consequences 
for breaching it and the defences available, they have one problem in common: the papers 
were published more than 20 years ago and thus, an update on some vital points was nee-
ded. 
  
                                                
 10	  C	  Baker	  and	  P	  David,	  The	  politically	  unsafe	  port	  [1986]	  LMCLQ	  112	  cited	  in	  Paul	  Todd,	  “Safe	  port	  issues:	  the	  Ocean	  Victory”	  Lloyd’s	  maritime	  and	  commercial	  law	  quarterly	  at	  1.	  11	  Niklas	  Sonnenschein,	  Unsafe	  ports	  and	  berths:	  charterers’	  defenses	  (2014).	  12	  Michael	  Wagener,	  “A	  relative	  concept”	  (2008)	  Maritime	  Risk	  International,	  online:	  <http://www.i-­‐law.com/ilaw/doc/view.htm?queryString=Saga+Cob&sort=date&sort=date&sea	  13	  Andrei	  Kharchanka,	  The	  Meaning	  of	  a	  Good	  Safe	  Port	  and	  Berth	  in	  a	  Modern	  Shipping	  World	  (rijksuniversiteit	  groningen,	  2014);	  Rhidian	  Thomas,	  “The	  safe	  port	  promise	  of	  charterers	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  English	  Common	  Law”	  (2006)	  Singapore	  Academy	  of	  Law	  Journal	  597	  at	  598;	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Even though, this gap has been recently covered14, there are still some problematic areas 
that remained untouched, both in terms of the primary and secondary safe port obligation. 
At the first place, it applies to certain elements that construct the charterer’s primary promi-
se of safe port. Thus, although it is commonly agreed that the port should be prospectively 
safe to be used by the vessel, there is a very little evaluation made on what exactly the term 
“prospective safety” means. The second unresolved issue concerns the situations when the 
charterer seem to fulfill his obligation towards safety of the port, but some events take 
place afterwards that render the port unsafe. The question arises then, whether the charterer 
has any further obligation towards the owner, or, to put it differently, the secondaty obliga-
tion towards the safe port should be introduced. The existence of such secondary obligation 
is not doubted in terms of time charterparties. When it comes to voyage charterparties, the 
matter in question provides a ground for some discussion due to the nature of the voyage 
charters specified above. 	  
1.2 The objective of the master thesis 	  	  
There are also some other problems that might be highlighted with regard to the safe port 
warranty in the charter parties, that can be summarized as the following: 
  
1. What constitutes the safe port, and how the safety of the port can be determined? 
2. Where the breach of the contractual obligation in question lies? 
3. Whether the notions on the essence and scope of the safe port warranty in general and on 
the secondary obligation to nominate the safe port in particular are applicable to the voyage 
charterparty agreements? 
  
                                                
 14	  Andrei	  Kharchanka,	  The	  Meaning	  of	  a	  Good	  Safe	  Port	  and	  Berth	  in	  a	  Modern	  Shipping	  World,	  Doctoral	  Series	  15	  (rijksuniversiteit	  groningen,	  2014).	  
 8 
These are the main issues to be analysed in the present paper. With that aim, structurally 
the work will be divided in two major parts: firstly, the elements of the primary safe port 
promise will be examined with the particular focus on the meaning of prospective safety of 
the port. The examination would be made preliminary on the basis of the English Law with 
the particular focus on the case law related to the time charterparty agreement. That is due 
to the fact that the most groundbreaking cases regarding safe port warranty were based on 
the time charterparties agreements. This is also partly explained by the fact that there are 
very few reliable sources that touch upon the abovementioned problems. This, however, 
should be seen not as an indication that the topic is not important, but that the more exten-
sive research is needed.  
 
When it comes to the second part, the paper will concentrate on the issues of secondary 
obligation with the particular focus on the voyage charterparties. 
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2 The safe port warranty: general observations   
Subject to some exceptions, it is common to stipulate, both in time and voyage charterparty 
agreements, or any hybrid of them, that ports and berths of loading and discharge to which 
the vessel is designated should be safe. Generally, this responsibility is allocated on the 
charterer’s side and known as the safe port warranty. However, the term “warranty” in the 
present context might be rather misleading. Thus, it is purely a matter of historical usage, 
and should not be viewed as a reference to the classification of contractual terms under 
English Law of Contract that determine the remedies available to the affected party in case 
of breach of the contractual agreement.15 Neither should the term “safe port warranty” be 
seen in line with a marine insurance warranty with a charterer as an insurer of port risks.16 
Rather, the safe port warranty is a contractual promise given by the charterer that the char-
tered ship would be employed between the safe ports.17   
 
Although the concept of safety is commonly viewed through public policy spectacles, the 
charterer’s contractual obligation discussed in this paper should be seen as an issue of 
commercial expediency.18 Hence, the nature and the ambit of the promise are defined by 
the parties’ intentions. To put it differently, the concept of the safe port is a matter of con-
tract and should be considered pursuant to a correspondent clause of the parties’ agreement 
with due regard to its wording. It is to note though, the parties are usually reluctant to base 
their contractual relationship on the standard charterparty forms. This has considerably 
helped in unifying law and providing a clear understanding of the essence of the promise.  
 
                                                
 15	  Lord	  Roskill	  [1983]	  A.C.	  736	  at	  765	  16	  Rhidian	  Thomas,	  “The	  safe	  port	  promise	  of	  charterers	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  English	  Common	  Law”	  (2006)	  Singapore	  Academy	  of	  Law	  Journal	  597	  at	  598.	  17	  Bernard	  Eder	  et	  al,	  Scruttom	  on	  Charterparties	  and	  Bills	  of	  Lading,	  Sweet	  &	  Maxwell	  ed	  (London,	  2011).	  18	  Rhidian	  Thomas,	  “The	  safe	  port	  promise	  of	  charterers	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  English	  Common	  Law”	  (2006)	  Singapore	  Academy	  of	  Law	  Journal	  597	  at	  598-­‐599.	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2.1 The source of the safe port warranty  	  
The vast majority of charterparty agreements, but not all of them, contain an express provi-
sion that frames a safe port warranty.  This notion is particularly applicable to time charter-
parties. For instance, Cl. 2 of Baltime 1939 as revised in 2001 stipulates the following:  
 
“ The vessel shall be employed in lawful trades … only between good and safe 
ports and places”19.  
 
Similarly, line 27 of the New York Produce Exchange Form 1946 (NYPE 1946) states that 
the vessel is to be engaged into lawful trades “between safe ports and/or places”20. 
 
Another example of the safe port warranty can be found in the BIMCO General Time Char-
ter Party (Gentime) from 1999, Cl. 2(a) of which provides: 
 
“The Vessel shall be employed in lawful trades…between safe ports or safe places 
where she can safely enter, lie always afloat, and depart”21.  
 
In case if the time charterparty agreement is silent on the safe port charterer’s obligation, 
the warranty in question may be implied due to business efficacy.22 This is particularly ap-
plied to those charterparties where the port is designated in accordance with the time char-
terer’s voyage orders.23  
 
                                                
 19	  The	  Baltic	  and	  International	  Maritime	  Council	  Uniform	  Time-­‐	  Charter	  Code	  (the	  Baltime	  1939	  as	  riveised	  in	  2001),	  Cl.	  2.	  	  	  20	  The	  New	  York	  Produce	  Exchange	  Form	  1946	  (NYPE	  1946),	  line	  27.	  21	  The	  BIMCO	  General	  Time	  Charter	  Party	  (Gentime)	  from	  1999,	  Cl.	  2(a).	  22	  Bingham	  LJ	  in	  The	  AJP	  Priti	  [1987]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  37	  at	  42.	  23	  Lord	  Goff	  of	  Chieveley	  in	  the	  Kanchenjunga	  [1990]	  1	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  391	  at	  397.	  
 11 
When it comes to standard voyage charterparties, the express obligation towards the port’s 
safety is not always stipulated. There are some forms that contain it though. For example, 
the tanker voyage charterparty Asbatankvoy from October 1977 that states:  
 
“The vessel…shall with all convenient dispatch, proceed as ordered to Loading Port 
named in accordance with Clause 4 hereof, or so near thereunto as she may safely 
get”24 
 
Similar contractual promise towards the port safety is also contained in Cl. 1 of The North 
American Grain Charterparty 1973 (the Northgrain 89) form and in the United Nations 
World Food Programme Voyage Charter Party (the Worldfood 99)  Cl. 2(a).  
 
It is to discuss then whether the safe port warranty shall be implied, if a voyage charterpar-
ty contract contains no express obligation with that regard. For many years the position 
present by Morris LJ in the Stork25 prevailed, according to which the warranty of safety 
would be automatically implied. If to consider law as it stands today, this notion is no long-
er valid. Hence, the courts are more reluctant to view a safe port warranty in line with the 
true construction of the charterparty agreement.26 As it was clarified in The Aegean Sea27, 
when the voyage charterparty calls for the nomination of a port or berth but contains no 
obligation towards its safety, the safe port warranty would usually, but not universally, be 
implied.28 The question of the implication of safe port warranty in that case would then be 
resolved pursuant to general contractual rules for the implication of terms; however, the 
degree of freedom to choose the port granted to the charterer would be considered. To be 
precise, if the charterer has the large discretion to choose the port, it is reasonable to imply 
a warranty of safety. In the same vein, if the charterparty agreement is quite concrete regar-
                                                
 24	  The	  Asbatankvoy	  1977,	  Cl.	  1.	  25	  Compania	  Naviera	  Maropan	  S/A	  v	  Bowater’s	  Lloyd	  Pulp	  and	  Paper	  Mills	  Ltd	  (The	  Stork)	  [1954]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  397	  (HC),	  [1955]	  1	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  349	  (CA).	  	  26	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al,	  Voyage	  Charters,	  3rd	  Edition	  ed	  (2007)	  at	  112.	  27	  Aegean	  Sea	  Traders	  Corpn	  v	  Repso;	  Petroleo	  SA	  (The	  Aegean	  Sea)	  [1998]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  39.	  28	  Thomas	  J.	  in	  the	  Aegean	  Sea	  [1998]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  39	  at	  p.	  67.	  
 12 
ding the intended ports and destinations, the owner is assumed to be satisfied with the level 
of safety of those places.29 
 
However, the issue of implied warranty falls outside the scope of this work. In case of the 
reader’s interest, the deep analysis of it might be found in Chris Ward, “Unsafe berths and 
implied terms reborn”30 and in Julian Cooke et al, Voyage Charters31. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
 29	  Rhidian	  Thomas,	  supra	  note	  7	  at	  610.	  30	  Chris	  Ward,	  “Unsafe	  berths	  and	  implied	  terms	  reborn”	  Lloyd’s	  maritime	  and	  commercial	  law	  quarterly	  489.	  31	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al,	  Voyage	  Charters,	  3rd	  Edition	  ed	  (2007).	  
 13 
3 The primary safe port contractual obligation  
3.1 Safe port: the meaning of the term  
The question of what should be understood under the safe port is frequently seen as a mat-
ter of construction of the charterparty agreement.32 In other words, the parties can exercise 
their right of the freedom of the contract and agree on any port characteristics they find 
reasonable. However, in practice that is rarely done and the parties usually stay within the 
standard terms.33 
 
Interestingly, when the earliest safe port cases were to be considered, there was a notion 
that the term “port” already implied the concept of safety, and the formulation of the “safe 
port” was unnecessary.34  
 
As to the classical definition35 of a safe port, the dictum of Sellers LJ in The Eastern City36 
should be considered. The dispute arose with regard to a voyage charter party agreement 
that provided that the vessel was to proceed from one or two safe ports in Morocco to a 
safe port in Japan. The vessel, the Eastern City, safely arrived and anchored in the nomina-
ted port, Mogador. It is to note though, that during the wintertime this port was not safe for 
the vessel as big as the Eastern City was. Thus, when the weather conditions changed, the 
master, suspecting that his anchor was dragging, made a decision to leave the port that re-
sulted in grounding.   
 
The shipowners therefore claimed that the charterers were in breach with the voyage char-
terparty, as the nominated port was not safe for the vessel.  
 
                                                
 32	  Bernard	  Eder	  et	  al.,	  Scruttom	  on	  Charterparties	  and	  Bills	  of	  Lading,	  150.	  33	  Rhidian	  Thomas,	  “The	  Safe	  Port	  Promise	  of	  Charterers	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  the	  English	  Common	  Law,”	  606.	  34	  Ogden	  v	  Graman	  and	  Another	  [1861]	  1	  B&S	  773.	  35	  Bernard	  Eder	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  8.	  36	  Sellers	  LJ	  in	  The	  Eastern	  City	  [1958]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  127.	  
 14 
Addressing this issue, Seller LJ established that:  
 
 
“ … a port will not be safe unless, in the relevant period of time, the particular ship 
can reach it, use it and return from it without, in the absence of some abnormal oc-
currence, being exposed to danger which cannot be avoided by good navigation and 
seamanship”37 
 
This statement of principle might be seen as one of a paramount importance at least from 
the two perspectives.  Firstly, Sellers’ dictum might be seen as a precise unification of all 
views on the safe port term known in the case law before.38   
 
Secondly, the honorable judge established a basic threefold test for estimating the ports 
safety.39 This test has become a starting point in examining the problems of safety in ju-
dicial courts and arbitration40, and can be broken down into three stages.   
 
Thus, following the Sellers LJ’s approach, the court is to sequentially examine the fol-
lowing: 
First, whether the ship can proceed to a port, use it and return without being exposed to the 
danger;  
Then, if not, it is to establish whether the good navigation and seamanship could have hel-
ped to avoid the danger;  
                                                
 37	  Sellers	  LJ	  in	  The	  Eastern	  City	  [1958]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  127	  at	  131.	  38	  Roskill	  LJ	  in	  the	  Hermine	  at	  page	  214;	  	  the	  house	  of	  lords	  lord	  diplock	  in	  the	  Evia	  No	  2	  as	  a	  “classic	  passage”;	  in	  wilford	  on	  time	  charters,	  6th	  edition,	  para	  10.3	  39	  The	  Ocean	  Victory	  [2014]	  1	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  59	  at	  98-­‐99.	  	  40	  Transoceanic	  Petroleum	  Carriers	  V	  Cook	  Industires	  Inc	  (the	  Mary	  Lou)	  [1981]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  272	  at	  276;	  Lord	  Roskill	  LJ	  in	  Unitramp	  v	  Garnac	  Grain	  Co	  Inc	  (The	  Hermine)	  [1979]	  1	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  212	  at	  214,	  Lord	  Diplock	  in	  the	  Evia	  No.2	  [1983]	  AC	  736	  at	  749;	  Terence	  Coghlin,	  Andrew	  W	  Baker	  &	  Julia,	  Time	  Charters,	  6th	  Edition	  ed	  (2008).	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Finally, if the ship was not able to proceed without being exposed to danger and if the 
danger could not be avoided by good navigation and seamanship, the courts are to determi-
ne whether this danger stemmed from any other event than an abnormal occurrence in the 
port. 
 
The port can be rendered as unsafe when the answers to the first two questions are negati-
ve, whereas the last one is answered positively.  
 
As it can be seen from above, the matters of good navigation and seamanship and abnormal 
occurrences are vital for understanding the meaning and effect of the safe port warranty. 
Therefore, a brief evaluation of both points is necessary to capture the issue in question. 
 
  
3.1.1 Good navigation and Seamanship  	  
Defining the safe port, Sellers LJ clarifies that the charterer’s contractual obligation of sa-
fety does not imply that the charterer would be liable for every causality that might occur 
within the port, and does not release the master and the shipowner from liability. The mas-
ter, the shipowner  or any servants or agents acting on his behalf, including tugs and pilots 
unless agreed otherwise, would still be found liable in case of negligence attributed to their 
side.41 This is directly implied by “danger which cannot be avoided by good navigation and 
seamanship”42 wording. 
 
To make it clear, every port naturally presents a certain degree of danger to a ship, starting 
from rocks and shallows and ending with waves, ice or storms. Therefore, the master has to 
present ordinary degree of care and good seamanship skills that would help him to avoid 
                                                
 41	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  17	  at	  130.	  42	  Sellers	  LJ	  in	  the	  Eastern	  City	  [1958]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  127	  at	  131	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the normal port risks. By “normal port risks” in this regard, the risks that could be been 
avoided by a reasonable competent master are understood.43 Therefore, the lack of compe-
tence of the master to avoid some natural obstructions of the port cannot be attributed to the 
charterer’s failure to nominate a safe port.44 
 
Generally, the “good navigation and seamanship” element of the safe port definition is in-
terpreted in two ways. Thus, some authors claim that the avoidable risks do not constitute 
the part of the safe port warranty, as the latter mentioned relates only to unavoidable dang-
ers. 45  
 
The majority of the legal thinkers, however, are of the opinion that the matter is not that 
straightforward and raise the question of causation.46 Namely, the master’s negligence 
might be viewed as a novus actus interveniens. This means that the negligence on the mas-
ter’s side could be the effective cause and break the causation link between the charterer’s 
non-fulfillment of the safe port obligation and the damage or loss to the ship.47 It follows 
then, that even though avoidable risks fall within the scope of the safe port obligation, the 
charterer’s position is protected pursuant to the rule of causation.48  
 
It is to note that the master is not expected to obtain any extraordinary skills. Thus, it is 
well established in practice, that if the high standard of seamanship and skills in the naviga-
tion are needed to avoid the danger presented in the port, the port should be considered 
                                                
 43	  They	  also	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  “risks	  which	  can	  be	  avoided	  by	  good	  seamanship”	  or	  “avoidable	  risks”	  in	  the	  legal	  literature,	  see,	  for	  instance,	  Julian	  Cooker	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  14	  at	  130;	  Tage	  Berglund	  v	  Montoro	  Shipping	  Corporation	  Ltd	  (The	  Dagmar)	  [1968]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  563	  at	  571.	  44	  The	  similar	  conclusion	  was	  made	  in	  St	  Vincent	  Shipping	  Co	  Ltd	  v	  Bock,	  Godeffroy	  &	  Co	  (The	  
Helen	  Miller)	  [1980]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  95.	  	  45	  Rhidian	  Thomas,	  supra	  note	  7	  at	  617.	  46	  See,	  for	  instance,	  Julian	  Cooker	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  14	  at	  130;	  Tage	  Berglund	  v	  Montoro	  Ship-­‐ping	  Corporation	  Ltd	  (The	  Dagmar)	  [1968]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  563	  at	  571.	  47	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  17	  at	  130.	  48	  David	  Chong	  Gek	  Sian,	  “Revisiting	  the	  safe	  port”	  (1992)	  Singapore	  Journal	  of	  Legal	  Studies	  79	  at	  618.	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unsafe, unless the danger is related to the abnormal occurrence that is to be discussed 
below.49 It is also to mention that even the damage sustained in the port, given that the mas-
ter showed the requisite degree of care and skill, does not automatically mean that the port 
was unsafe and that the charterer was in breach of the safe port warranty. As rightly sugge-
sted by Mustill J, sometimes the causality occurring in the port is merely the question of 
bad luck.50   
 
In deciding on the matters of master’s negligence, the courts take into consideration the fact 
that masters are usually put into a difficult position and pressured by charterers and shi-
powners.51 Thus, the master can often be trapped in a position where he would have to 
choose in between the commercial expediency of the adventure or its safety.52 That is why 
the court will first of all address the question whether the master acted reasonably under the 
existed circumstances.53  	  
3.1.2 Abnormal occurrence  	  As	  it	  has	  been	  already	  submitted,	  the	  safe	  port	  warranty	  should	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  promise	  that	  the	  port	  would	  be	  completely	  free	  of	  risks.	  Instead,	  by	  undertaking	  the	  safe	  port	  obligation,	  the	  charterer	  guarantees	  that	  the	  inherent	  characteristics	  of	  the	  port	   would	   present	   no	   danger	   to	   the	   vessel.	   To	   put	   it	   differently,	   it	   follows	   from	  Sellers’	  definition,	   that	   the	  charterer’s	  obligation	   to	  provide	  a	  safe	  port	  does	  not	  ex-­‐tend	  to	  abnormal	  occurrences	  or	  the	  risks	  of	  abnormal	  danger.	  Those	  risks	  are	  com-­‐monly	  characterized	  as	  those	  that	  do	  not	  form	  characteristics	  of	  the	  particular	  port.	  In	  this	  vein,	  it	  seems	  logical	  to	  evaluate	  on	  what	  is	  in	  fact	  understood	  under	  the	  normal	  
                                                
 49	  Parker	  J	  in	  the	  Polyglory	  [1977]	  	  50	  Mustill	  J	  in	  the	  Mary	  Lou	  [1981]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  272	  at	  279.	  51	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al.,	  Voyage	  Charterers,	  at	  127-­‐128.	  52	  Rhidian	  Thomas,	  supra	  note	  7	  at	  618.	  53	  Singleton	  J	  in	  Compania	  Naviera	  Maropan	  S.A.	  v	  Bowaters	  Lloyd	  Pulp	  and	  Paper	  Mills	  Ltd.	  (The	  Stork)	  [1955]	  2	  QB	  68	  at	  89.	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risks	   or	   inherent	   characteristics	   of	   the	  port,	   before	  highlighting	   the	   core	  matters	   of	  abnormal	  occurrences.	  	  	  
3.1.2.1 Normal risks 	  
Thus, it goes without saying that the safe port warranty is confined with the characteristics 
of the nominated port, as the charterer’s liability for the breach of safe port warranty is 
triggered by the loss or damage sustained due to the danger that is a normal feature of the 
port.  It is to note that not the general safety of the port should be considered, in accordance 
to Seller LJ’s wording, but the safety of the specific port for a specific ship at the specific 
time.54  
 
This position is easily justified. Evidently, each port has its own genuine characteristics as 
to physical condition of the port structures, depth of water and etc. While the port can be 
absolutely safe for one ship to enter, stay and leave, it can present significant danger to 
another.55 Hence, Sellers LJ declares that the question whether a port is a safe one should 
be seen as a matter of fact and degree with a particular ship to be considered.56 In other 
words, all relevant circumstances of the case are to be assessed: the type, class, characteris-
tics and capabilities of the ship.57 Furthermore, the port should be safe not only for the ship 
per se, but also for the crew, meaning that if there is the danger of health or security risks, 
the port can be rendered unsafe as well.58  	  
There are numerous characteristics of the port that present different types of unsafety de-
tected in the legal literature. They can relate to the terrestrial, marine or environmental cha-
                                                
 54	  Sellers	  LJ	  in	  the	  Eastern	  City	  [1958]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  127	  at	  131.	  	  55	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al.,	  Voyage	  Charters,	  supra	  note	  14	  at	  123.	  56	  Bernard	  Eder	  et	  al.,	  Scruttom	  on	  Charterparties	  and	  Bills	  of	  Lading,	  152.	  57	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  17	  at	  123.	  58	  Rhidian	  Thomas,	  “The	  Safe	  Port	  Promise	  of	  Charterers	  from	  the	  Perspective	  of	  the	  English	  Common	  Law,”	  608.	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racteristics of the port, as well as to its administrative set-up. However, the evaluation on 
this subject lies outside the scope of this work, and it has been covered extensively by 
Andrei Kharchanka59 in his recent study.  
 
The question arises then which characteristics of the port should be viewed as normal ones. 
Generally, those characteristics are defined as inherent and intrinsic attributes of a port that 
are well-established in a sense that their existence can be capable proved by evidence.  It is 
suggested that the inherent characteristics of the port should have a continuous character, 
but it is not entirely correct. First of all, the established characteristics by their own can 
have a changeable nature, such as weather conditions, for instance.60  
 
That is to say that the longevity of the port’s characteristic can be of importance, but even 
the danger of a temporary character might render a port unsafe.61 This, however, would 
again depend on the length of time during which the temporary obstacle would exist. Thus, 
if the temporary danger prevails during considerable time, it can be qualified as attributes 
of the nominated port.62  
 
This idea has been firstly suggested in the Houston City63. In the case at hand, the nomina-
ted berth was exposed to strong gales during certain season and thus, two hauling-off buoys 
were usually used to prevent a ship from ranging. However, when the ship was staying in 
the port, they stern buoy was damaged and was under the repair, while the waling piece 
was missing for several months. It was acknowledged at first instance that although the 
absence of the hauling-off buoys and the waling piece by their own did not constitute the 
characteristics of the port and have no impact on its safety, they were essential to be used in 
                                                
 59	  Andrei	  Kharchanka,	  The	  Meaning	  of	  a	  Good	  Safe	  Port	  and	  Berth	  in	  a	  Modern	  Shipping	  World	  (rijksuniversiteit	  groningen,	  2014).	  60	  Similar	  thought	  was	  expressed	  by	  Mustill	  J	  in	  the	  Mary	  Lou	  [1981]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  272	  at	  283.	  61	  Bernard	  Eder	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  8.	  62	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  17	  at	  126.	  63	  Readon	  Smith	  Line	  Ltd	  c	  Australian	  Wheat	  Board	  (The	  Houston	  City)	  [1954]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  148	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the winter weather.64 Consequently, since the named constructions were absent for a suf-
ficient time, the port was declared unsafe. 
 
As a drawback, the Houston City decision is silent on the matter of how long the temporary 
obstacle should operate to be treated as permanent attributes of the contractual port. This, 
however, was the subject of consideration in the Hermine. This case dealt with the delay of 
the vessel that was claimed to be caused by the unsafety of the port.65 It therefore was es-
tablished that the obstacles of temporary character should be in operation for such period of 
time that would subsequently frustrate the nature of adventure and the nature of the con-
tract.66  
 
Overall, it should be highlighted once again that there should be a causation link between 
the occurrence resulted in damage or loss to the vessel and a port’s normal or inherent cha-
racteristic for establishing the breach of the charterer’s liability in question. The conditions 
of port’s safety depend on concrete facts; the standards of safety are established by law 
though. Hence, although the evaluation on the port’s safety should be performed pursuant 
to the concrete merits of the case, it also should be based on the solid legal principles.67 	  
3.1.2.2 Abnormal risks  	  
As it has been stressed above, the safe port warranty undertaken by the charterer, pursuant 
to by Sellers LJ’s definition, exists only “in the absence of some abnormal occurrence”68. 
That is to say, that the charterer’s contractual obligation in question extends only to the 
risks of normal danger, whereas the abnormal risks are left outside the scope of the safe 
                                                
 64	  Ibid.	  at	  159-­‐161.	  65	  Unitramp	  v	  Garnac	  Grain	  Co	  Inc	  (The	  Hermine)	  [1979]	  1	  Lloyd’s	  Rep.	  212	  	  66	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  17	  at	  128.	  67	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al.,	  Voyage	  Charters,	  119.	  68	  [1958]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  127	  at	  139.	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port warranty. It is to note that the master is still expected to exercise requisite degree of 
skill, care and good seamanship.69 
 
The Sellers LJ’s notion on the abnormal occurrence is silent on the extent of such rest-
riction and on what the criteria of the abnormality are.  It has been generally accepted that 
the abnormality of the event should be assessed on the basis of the concrete facts and cir-
cumstances of every particular case. 
 
As to the kind of risks that can fall within the abnormal category, it was suggested by Mus-
till J in the Mary Lou70 that everything not constituting the normal characteristics of the 
port is abnormal.71   That is to say, the safe port warranty excludes everything that is not 
included in it by the definition.  However, it has been proved in practice, that even a normal 
risk, i.e. a risk that stems from the inherent attributes of the port, can cause an abnormal 
consequences resulting in damage or loss sustained by the vessel.72  For instance, unpre-
dictable gales might form an inherent and intrinsic characteristic of the port, but the conse-
quences of one particular gale can be so unexpectedly severe that it can be viewed as an 
abnormal occurrence.  
 
There are two cases that might be referred to as a good example for the abovementioned.  
One of them is the  famous the Evia No.273, that is considered to be groundbreaking for the 
wide survey of the law regarding safe port warranty and the consequent clarification with 
that regard. As to the merits of the case, the dispute arose with regard to the time charter-
party agreement on the basis of the Baltime 1939 form, amended by the parties. Clause 2 of 
the charterparty contained a safe port warranty. The chartered vessel was to carry cement 
                                                
 69	  Mustill	  J	  in	  the	  Mary	  Lou	  [1981]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  272	  at	  278.	  70	  Transoceanic	  Petroleum	  Carriers	  v	  Cook	  Industries	  Inc	  (The	  Mary	  Lou)	  [1981]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  272.	  	  71	  Mustill	  J	  in	  the	  Mary	  Lou	  [1981]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  272	  at	  278.	  72	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  17	  at	  139.	  73	  Kodros	  Shipping	  Corpn	  v	  Empresa	  Cubana	  de	  Fletes	  (No	  2)	  (The	  Evia	  No.	  2)	  [1983]	  1	  AC	  736;	  [1982]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  307.	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from Cuba to Basrah, when she was trapped in the Shatt-al-Arab waterway due to the out-
break of hostilities between Iraq and Iran.74 However, the House of Lords established that 
the outbreak of war and the consequent threat to the vessel materialized after her arrival to 
the port and nothing in the time of ordering and approaching the port made it possible to 
predict such outbreak. Therefore, it was established that the charterer fulfilled his safe port 
obligation and there was no breach of cl 2 of the time charterparty agreement.  
 
However, in the Evia No. 2 the charterer would have been found liable for the breach of the 
safe port promise, if the outbreak of war occurred before the vessel was ordered or at the 
time she was approaching the port. Furthermore, the charterer would also have been liable, 
if the risk of the outbreak could have been estimated at the mentioned time, as if the danger 
of the war existed for a substantial time and become an attribute of the port. That was a 
case in The Lucille75, the factual background of which quite resembles that of  Evia No. 2. 
However, the charterer in the Lucille ordered the vessel to Basrah when the outbreak of 
war was already evident. The Court of Appeal highlighted that abnormal occurrences, alt-
hough they were abnormal, should have nevertheless been expected.76  Therefore, the char-
terer by ordering the vessel to the unsafe port was acting in breach of safe port warranty 
and was the one responsible for the entrapment of the vessel and the consequential damage.  
 
Overall, the charterer would not be liable for any loss or damage stemmed from extraordi-
nary or unpredicted event, i.e. something that follows outside inherent characteristic of the 
port. The issue of normal characteristic of the port and abnormal occurrences is usually 
viewed as a matter of fact and thus, should be decided in accordance with factual back-
ground of particular case.   
 
                                                
 74	  Kodros	  Shipping	  Corpn	  v	  Empresa	  Cubana	  de	  Fletes	  (No	  2)	  (The	  Evia	  No.	  2)	  [1983]	  1	  AC	  736;	  [1982]	  2	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  307	  at	  309.	  75	  Uni-­‐Ocean	  Lines	  Pte	  Ltd	  v	  C-­‐Trade	  SA	  (The	  Lucille)	  [1984]	  1	  Lloyd’s	  Rep	  244.	  76	  Julian	  Cooke	  et	  al,	  supra	  note	  17	  at	  129.	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It has already been noted the definition of the safe port provided by Sellers LJ in The 
Eastern City is commonly considered as the “classic passage” that correctly explains the 
meaning and the effect of the warranty in question.77 However, in the recent case dealing 
with the safe port warranty, The Ocean Victory, Teare J suggested that the Sellers LJ’s test 
should be slightly elaborated and introduced a new stage to the test, that will be briefly 
overviewed below.  
 
The present paper will share the position that indeed, the Seller LJ’s test for the port’s sa-
fety calls for some specifications. Though, those specifications should relate not to the un-
derstanding of the safe port per se, as the Seller LJ’s definition proved to be a solid one and 
all attempts to adjust it, in essence might be clarified as rewriting Sellers LJ’s test using the 
different terms. What really calls for further elaboration is the matters of applicability and 
operation of the safe port test. Thus, first of all,  Seller LJ does not indicate where the 
breach of the safe port promise lies: whether it is in the giving of the order to proceed to a 
port, or the charterer would breach his safe port promise when the damage or loss is actu-
ally sustained by the vessel. Secondly, it is unclear at what time the test of port’s safety 
should be applied. Those issues were partly resolved in the leading the Evia No. 2 case.  
The position reached by the Court in the mentioned case would also be discussed in the 
following part of the paper.     	  
3.2 The Ocean Victory: the new approach towards the Sellers LJ’s test of 
safety  	  	  
As it has already been submitted, although it is commonly accepted that the Sellers’ evalua-
tion on the safe port fully and correctly clarifies the nature of the contractual promise in 
question, recently the dispute that challenged this position arose recently. Thus, in the 
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  Teare	  J	  in	  Gard	  Marine	  &	  Energy	  LTD	  v	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Ocean Victory78 the High Court was to decide whether the charterer fulfilled his obligation 
regarding the safe port nomination. Among other issues, the Sellers’ test of safety was 
reconsidered and the new stage to the Sellers LJ’s test was introduced.  
 
The decision of the first instance at hand has been published quite recently and, to the best 
of the knowledge and information available, has not received any substantial academic 
comment. The present paper shares the position, that although the nice overview of the core 
aspects of the safe port warranty can be found in The Ocean Victory, the attempt of Teare J 
to introduce a new stage to the test was not that essential for the understanding of nature of 
the safe port warranty, as the threefold Sellers LJ’s test covers it in a great extent. However, 
it is fair to note that only future will show whether the courts will be reluctant to follow the 
Teare J’s evaluation, or will go for a classic approach introduced in The Eastern City.  
 
As to the factual background of the case, it seems to be rather exemplary for those disputes 
where the safe port issue is involved. The parties to the dispute entered into a time charter-
party agreement based on Barecon 89 form amendment by the parties: part II of Cl 5 regar-
ding the trade limits was deleted and instead, the additional Cl 29 was introduced that pro-
vided that the chartered vessel should be employed only between good and safe ports.  
 
The vessel Ocean Victory was ordered to a port Kashima, Japan where she was to dis-
charge and berthed. However, once the discharge procedures were completed, the port was 
affected by long waves. As opposed to the swell waves, the long one could cause dang-
erous ranging or surging, and hence, jeopardize the integrity of the vessel’s mooring.  Since 
the weather conditions were expected to worsen, the master after the consultation with a 
local pilot, decided to leave the port and anchor out till the time the weather conditions im-
proved.  However, on the way out, the vessel was exposed to extremely strong winds and 
was caught in between the shore on the one side and a breakwater on the other, limiting her 
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maneuvering capability. Consequently, the steerage way was lost and the vessel foundered 
against the breakwater, went aground, was abandoned by the crew, and some time later 
broke, notwithstanding the salvage operation efforts.  	  
In determining whether Kashima could be considered as a safe port for the vessel, the Sel-
lers’ test was commonly used as a starting point. However, while applying the classic test 
of the safe port, Teare J slightly deviated from it and asked a couple of elaborative quest-
ions.79  Those questions are claimed to constitute an additional, the fourth stage of the test 
of the port safety. Some authors also refer to it as a preliminary stage, since it is designated 
to examine the remoteness of the risks of danger.80 
 
To be precise, before following the Sellers LJ’s approach, Teare J questioned whether the 
risk of long waves, which challenged the port’s safety, was so remote that no precautions 
were required:  
 
“The first question is thus whether, when Ocean Victory was ordered to proceed to 
Kashima […], there was a risk that Ocean Victory might have to leave the port on 
account of long waves and bad weather because it was feared that she could not be 
restrained by her moorings…”81 
 
Also, the honorable judge stressed that it is of paramount importance that:  
 
“there was a real, as opposed to a fanciful risk, that long waves might occur at the same 
time as a low pressure system giving rise to gale force northerly winds in the channel”82.  
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This introduction of a preliminary stage of the safety test has been roughly criticized by 
some authors. Thus, it has been submitted that the Teare L’s preliminary stage in essence 
just re-states that the charterer’s liability does not extend to abnormal risks, or to occurren-
ces of abnormal character, that, as it is already known, constitutes the third stage of Seller 
LJ’s test.83  
 
Since the differences between the abnormal occurrence and remoteness of the risk of 
damage is rather difficult, if not impossible, to find, and the mentioned decision is silent on 
any differentiating line between those terms as well, the preliminary stage has been quali-
fied by some scholars as irrelevant.84 Furthermore, it has been argued that the introduction 
of the first stage might cause some unnecessary complication for the courts, if the test sug-
gested by Teare J is to be followed in the future.85  
 
On the one hand, the examination of remoteness of the risk of danger separately from the 
issue of abnormal occurrence might be seen reasonable in this particular case. It is expla-
ined by the differences in the factual merits of The Ocean Victory and The Eastern City 
disputes. Thus, the factual background of both cases is quite the same, in a sense that the 
causality happened at the time the vessels were to leave the port due to the weather condi-
tions. The main distinguishing line is that in The Ocean Victory such conditions were un-
common for the port, whereas in The Eastern City high winds were expected. However, 
hardly can this reason justify the necessity of adjusting the Sellers LJ’s test with a separate 
remoteness test.  
 
Overall, it can be concluded, that although the Sellers LJ’s test is quite basic and straight-
forward, it covers all the essential elements needed for understanding the meaning of port’s 
safety. The test as towards the nature of the safe port can be evaluated and adjusted, as it 
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was a case in The Ocean Victory, but such adjustments do not always bring any positive 
input in the understanding of the term.  	  
3.3 The Evia No.2: the essential specification to the Sellers LJ’s test  	  
It has already been suggested, that if the Sellers LJ’s test is to be specified, the main focus 
should be on the problems of the moment to which the breach of the warranty can be atta-
ched, and the time when the safety of the port test should be applied. Those issues remai-
ned rather problematic up till the time The Evia No. 2 case was resolved in the House of 
Lords. The case is rightly considered to be leading and groundbreaking in terms of the un-
derstanding the nature and the effect of the safe port warranty in general, and the meaning 
of a safe port in particular.  	  
The merits of the case were overviewed above, however for the sake of clarity might be 
briefly repeated. The dispute arose on the basis of time charterparty agreement based on the 
Baltime 1939 form, Cl 2 of which stipulated that “the vessel to be employed in lawful tra-
des for the carriage of lawful merchandise only between good and safe ports”86. In 
accordance with the present agreement, the charterer ordered the vessel for the carriage of 
cement from Cuba to Basrah in March 1980. On the 1 July 1980 the Evia reached the 
waterway in Shatt-al-Arab, but her entrance to a berth was delayed for almost two months, 
till 20 August 1980 due to the port congestion. On 22 September 1980 the cargo was 
discharged and the vessel could leave the port. However, by that date the war between Iran 
and Iraq had started with the effect that Basrah and the area nearby were blocked by hostili-
ties. Consequently, the ships being employed in this area were trapped in the port.   It is 
important to note that nothing suggested the outbreak of the war at the time the order to 
proceed to Basrah was given. Furthermore, even when the ship entered the port the war was 
still not expected. To specify, the vessel was exposed to danger only after the arrival to the 
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port, and this danger could not have been predicted beforehand. In order to establish 
whether the charterer was in breach of the safe port warranty, the House of Lords recon-
sidered the charterer’s contractual obligation in question and its relation to the content of 
the safe port warranty. The decision therefore, brings a light on some fundamental pro-
blems that will be discussed below.  To be precise, it clarified two facts essential for the 
understanding of the doctrine:  	  
● it	   is	  giving	  the	  order	  to	  go	  to	  a	  particular	  port	  or	  place	  of	  loading	  or	  dis-­‐
charge	  that	  constitutes	  the	  breach	  of	  the	  safe	  port	  contractual	  obligation87;	  
● 	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  port	  should	  be	  assessed	  at	  the	  time	  of	  such	  order	  is	  given.88	  	  	  The	  justification	  for	  this	  position	  will	  be	  given	  below.	  	  	  
Pursuant to the position expressed by Lord Roskill in the case at hand, the charterer’s con-
tractual obligation towards the port’s safety stems from the right to direct the employment 
of the ship. Thus, the nomination of the port is viewed as an active exercise of the charte-
rer’s mentioned right. For that reason, “it is clearly at that point of time when that order is 
given that that contractual promise by the charterer regarding the safety of that intended 
port or place must be fulfilled”89. However, the charterer’s promise relates not to the state 
of the port at the time of the nomination, rather it relates to a certain period of time in the 
future when the vessel actually get to the port stay in, so far as necessary, and in due 
course, leave.90  	  
By stipulating this, the House of Lords effectively abolished the concept of absolute conti-
nuing safe port obligation that had prevailed in the legal world before and introduced the 
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concept of the prospective safety of the port.91 The absolute continuing obligation to provi-
de a safe port in essence means that once the charterer undertook the obligation in question, 
he declares that the port is safe starting from the time of nomination and that it would 
remain as such during the whole voyage.92 	  
On the other hand, the requirement of the prospective safety means that the port is 
guaranteed to be safe for the particular vessel when the ship is actually to get to, stay in, so 
far as necessary, and in due course, leave the port.93 Hence, as apposed to the absolute sa-
fety construction, the prospective safety obligation relates to the point of time in the future 
when the vessel would actually arrives to the port.94 Therefore, the actual state of the port 
at the moment when the ship arrives is of the paramount importance for the assessing 
whether the charterer fulfilled his contractual obligation in question or not. The fact that the 
charterer exercised reasonable care in determining the port’s conditions would usually be 
seen as irrelevant.95  Thus, the safe port obligation would be fulfilled, even if at the time of 
nomination or during the approach voyage the port was unsafe, as long as the set-up of the 
port is perfectly safe by the time the vessel has caused to use the port. 96  	  It	   is	   to	  note	   that	   the	  previously	  mentioned	  notions	  on	   the	  good	  navigation	  and	  sea-­‐manship	   requirement	   and	   the	   abnormal	  occurrence	  exception	  are	   still	   relevant:	   the	  prospective	  safety	  obligation	  does	  not	  allocate	   the	  risk	  of	  abnormal	  and	  unexpected	  event	  on	  the	  charterer,	  neither	  the	  charterer	  should	  be	  responsible	  for	  danger	  which	  could	  have	  been	  avoided	  by	  requisite	  degree	  of	  care	  and	  seamanship.	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  It	  is	  important	  to	  highlight	  once	  again	  that	  the	  	  crucial	  moment	  when	  the	  safety	  of	  the	  port	  should	  be	  assessed	  is	  at	  time	  of	  nomination,	  although	  the	  promise	  itself	  relates	  to	  the	   future	  state	  of	   the	  port.	   In	   this	  vein,	   the	  concept	  of	  prospective	  safety	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  tool	  to	   link	  the	  temporal	  dislocation	  between	  the	  time	  of	  the	  fulfillment	  of	  the	  obligation	  in	  question	  (the	  time	  when	  the	  order	  to	  proceed	  is	  given)	  and	  the	  time	  to	  which	  the	  essence	  of	  the	  promise	  in	  fact	  relates	  (the	  prospective	  safety	  of	  the	  port	  on	   the	  moment	   of	   the	   arrival	   of	   the	   vessel).	   From	   this	   perspective,	   the	   prospective	  safety	  construction	  is	  rightly	  considered	  to	  be	  more	  practical	  and	  reasonable	  in	  com-­‐mercial	  terms	  than	  the	  absolute	  ones.97	  It	  reflects	  the	  modern	  position	  adopted	  by	  the	  courts	  that	  port’s	  safety	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  fact	  and	  the	  state	  of	  the	  port	  at	  the	  moment	  of	  the	  nomination;	  the	  potential	  risks	  related	  to	  the	  use	  of	  a	  port	  should	  also	  be	  estimated.98	  	  	  	  
To sum up, the fact whether the charterer fulfilled his obligation regarding the safe port 
warranty should be assessed on the time when the order to proceed is given. The promise 
itself, however, relates to the prospective state of the port, namely to the upcoming point of 
time when the vessel would actually get to the port. Thus, the charterer would be liable for 
the breach of the warranty in question only when the port is proved to be unsafe at the mo-
ment when the vessel is approaching, staying in and leaving it. 	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4 The prospective safety of the port: some practical and 
theoretical problems  	  
It follows from above that prospective safety of the port estimated at the time when the 
vessel is ordered to proceed is an important criterion to measure the fulfillment of the char-
terer’s safe port obligation.  Interestingly though, Lord Roskill provided no further evalua-
tion on this term in his historical decision. Therefore, the meaning of the term and its ambit 
have formed a subjection of a rigid discussion in the legal world. One of the problems that 
is mentioned is that prospective safety relates to the prospective or potential dangers to 
which the ship might be exposed in the port.99 Such prospective risks do not always consti-
tute the initial characteristics of the port. Nevertheless, they fall within the charterer’s un-
dertakings regarding safety if there is a “prospective” likelihood of those risks materialising 
and negatively affecting the vessel. Hence, the problem arises how exactly prospective sa-
fety of the port might be estimated. The discussion of this matter would constitute the next 
part of the present paper. 
4.1 The test for the prospective safety: should the concept of foreseeability 
be applicable?  	  
Some authors suggest that the prospective safety should be examined in accordance with 
the concept of foreseeability.100 However, this concept presents a considerable practical and 
theoretical difficulty. Precisely, there is a dispute whether the test of foreseeability is an 
accurate one and can be applicable to the perspective safety in general. Secondly, it is 
questioned whether the foresight of the diligent charterer, shipowner or any other personal 
should be considered.  	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As it has been mentioned, the term “prospective safety of the port” was firstly introduced in 
The Evia No. 2, but left without any other specification as towards how the prospective 
safety of the port should be determined. Despite the fact that the fundamental decision of 
the Evia No. 2 was ruled more than thirty years ago, there is still no consensus on this issue 
among the legal authorities. There is also an obvious lack of the fundamental legal deci-
sions and academic works that might specify the problem.  	  
In some publications that followed The Evia No. 2 decision101, it was suggested that 
prospective safety of the port should be subject to the test of foreseeability.102 Likewise, a 
brief notion of foreseeability could also be found in Reardon Smith Line Ltd.103, to which 
Lord Roskill referred in his ruling, although regarding a different matter. To be precise, 
Lord Somerwell of Harrow mentioned that  	  
4.2 The Saga Cob case: is the applicability of the doctrine of foreseeability 
towards the prospective safety issues revealed?  	  
One of the first attempts to clarify the applicability of the doctrine in question towards the 
prospective safety of a port can be found in the Saga Cob104.  	  
In accordance with the factual background, the Saga Cob vessel was charted to carry an 
aviation fuel on the basis of the Shelltime 3 standard form, clause 3 of which contained a 
due diligence obligation regarding the safety of the nominated ports. The dispute between 
the parties stemmed from an attack on the vessel by Eritrean guerillas. The attack took 
place while the vessel was anchored about four to five miles north east of the Massawa 
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harbor entrance, the Ethiopian port the chartered vessel had successfully called at over 20 
times. Due to the attack, the considerable damage to the vessel was made, including her 
hull, engine room, and steering gear, among others. The shipowner brought a case against 
the charterer claiming damages for breach of the safe port warranty. The court was to deci-
de whether at the time the ship was ordered, the designated port was safe for her to use.  	  
At first instance, Diamond J ruled that the port was unsafe and therefore, the charterers 
were liable for the breach of the contractual obligation in question. Although this decision 
was reversed at the Court of Appeal later on, Diamond J’s  understanding of prospective 
safety of the port presents a certain academic interest.  	  
Diamond J submits that in order to determine whether the charterer fulfilled his preliminary 
safe port contractual obligation, one should consider whether there was a foreseeable risk at 
the time of nomination that the vessel might be exposed to danger.105   Given that the risk 
was foreseeable, it forms a characteristic of the port. In that vein, the judge stressed:  	  
“This characteristic may not have involved a high degree of risk but equally the risk 
cannot properly be regarded as negligible.”106  	  
It can be concluded then, that the safe port warranty includes all risks that could not be 
dismissed as negligible.   
 
Further, the Diamond J specified that the issues of prospective safety should be estimated 
in the context of the wider situation around the port.107 To be precise, the question of 
prospective safety would depend on the factual background that is to be known by a rea-
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sonably well-informed person.108 For instance, in the Saga Cob case, the political situation 
around the designated port was such that the attacks on strategic targets, as the vessel in 
question with the aviation fuel on board, could have been easily predicted by a reasonable 
person who possessed the historical and geographical knowledge about the region.109 
Hence, Diamond J also introduced the element of the reasonability to the concept of fore-
seeability.110 
 
Whereas there are some cases that seem to follow this reasonable foreseeability pathway, 
there is also a considerable amount of legal thinkers that profoundly challenged the appli-
cability of the discussed doctrine towards the issues of prospective safety of the port.111  
Thus, they insist that in practice the test of foreseeability scrutinizes and unnecessarily 
complicates the litigation.112 Furthermore, even if to assume that the reasonable foreseeabi-
lity test is an accurate criterion for determining the prospective safety, it is uncertain whose 
foresight should be taken into consideration. For the sake of clarity, the latter issue will be 
discussed now, after which the paper will focus on the criticism of The Sage Cob decision 
at first instance.  
 
“ There was a discussion […] as to the position if, at the time of nomination, the 
port would so far as could be foreseen be safe for the vessel when loading but 
became unsafe later through circumstances unforeseeable by the charterer...”113, 	  	  
but again no further evaluation on this issue was made.  
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On the other hand, the applicability of the foreseeability test was challenged in practise. 
Thus, in his speech, Staughton J stressed that nothing in the Evia No. 2 implies the applica-
bility of the foreseeability test to the matters of the safe port warranty.114 Indeed,  no refe-
rence to the foreseeability doctrine can be found in Lord Roskill’s speech . Though, some 
authors claim that if his whole speech and its ambit are to be considered, the different con-
clusion might be made.115  
 
That is to say, Lord Roskill specified that the fact that a contractual obligation towards the 
port’s safety should be fulfilled at the moment when the order to proceed is given does not 
automatically imply that the port should be safe at that time.116   If it was so, the charterer 
would be deprived from nominating the ice-bound port which, however, both to his and 
shipowner’s knowledge, “in all human possibility would be ice-free by the time that vessel 
reached it”117.  Adherents of the applicability of the foreseeability doctrine claim that this 
part of the ruling can be of an interest from two perspectives.118  
 
First of all, and it has been already highlighted above, the case illustrates that obstacles that 
contribute to the port’s unsafety, but which can be removed or avoided by the time the ship 
proceeds, have no impact on the nature of the contractual obligation in question. Secondly, 
Lord Roskill’s numerously refers both to the charterer’s and shipowner’s state of knowled-
ge that those obstacles are “in all human possibility” temporary in nature. It is suggested 
that this notion implicitly invokes the test of foreseeability for determining the possible 
charterer’s knowledge regarding the prospective safety of the port.119 To be concrete, the 
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port can be rendered prospectively safe when it could have been foreseeable for the charte-
rer that temporary obstacles would be eliminated by the time the vessel required to enter.120 
 
The certain affirmation of this position can be found in The Evaggelos TH121 case, in which 
Donaldson J approved that if the state of the port as to its safety changed after the nomina-
tion, the reasonable foreseeability of that change is to be considered. 122 However, no 
further evaluation on the test of foreseeability was made in this decision. Remarkably, Do-
naldson J’s argumentation was expressly criticized by Lord Roskill in The Evia No. 2.123 
This fact undoubtedly contributes to uncertainty regarding the question whether the test of 
foreseeability is an accurate criterion for assessing the prospective safety of the port.  
	  
4.3 The test of foreseeability: whose foresight should be considered?  	  	  
Although Diamond J was one of the first authorities that viewed the doctrine of foreseeabi-
lity as a criterion for estimating the port’s prospective safety, his ruling does not specify a 
personnel who is to foresee the safety of the port.  
 
Thus, the judge throughout the whole ruling expressly and implicitly highlighted the ne-
cessity to estimate the risk of danger to the vessel from the reasonably informed person’s 
perspective.124 However, in some parts the mentioned judge referred to the knowledge of 
the reasonably informed charterer, and in others, to the knowledge of reasonably informed 
port-master.125  No further specification regarding the personnel, from whose perspective 
the prospective safety is to be considered, can be found in The Saga Cob ruling.  Some 
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authors argue, that this is mainly due to the fact that the factual background of The Saga 
Cob case makes this issue immaterial.126 	  
However, if to consider other rulings that are dealing with reasonable foreseeability127, the 
three main approaches to the personnel whose foresight should be considered in order to 
estimate the prospective safety of the port can be detected.  
 
First of all, there are those who claim that the charterer’s reasonable view on prospective 
safety of the port is of the preliminary importance. Secondly, there are some scholars that 
insist that the charterer should have absolute, rather than reasonable, knowledge on the 
prospective safety. Thirdly, the opponents of the abovementioned positions can be found. 
They submit that the foresight of the shipowner or post-master is the determinative one for 
estimating the port’s prospective safety.128 As a matter of fact, there is also a position that 
the decision to send a vessel to a port eventually is a risk estimated by both parties to the 
charterparty agreement129, therefore both foresights should be taken into consideration.  
 
Interestingly, these three approaches adopted by legal thinkers to a large extent reflect their 
different understanding of nature of the contractual obligation to nominate a safe port.  
Those positions can be summarized as the following:  
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4.3.1 The foresight of the reasonable charterer as a criterion for estimating the 
prospective safety 
 
The adherents of this position build it upon the fact that the promise to provide a safe port 
is initially the charterer’s one. For that reason, the view of the reasonable well-informed 
charterer should be of the preliminary importance for foreseeing the perspective safety of 
the nominated port.   
	  
4.3.2 The foresight of the charterer with the absolute knowledge 
 
The advocates of the present position focus on the fact that the contractual obligation in 
question stems from the charterparty agreement and has the nature of the warranty.130 The-
refore, it presumes the strict liability of the charterer who guarantees the safety of the no-
minated port, certainly with the abnormal occurrences reservation.131 In that vein, it seems 
to be illogical to expect only the reasonable knowledge on the side of the charterer when it 
comes to the foreseeability test. 132 Rather, the knowledge regarding the prospective port 
safety should be absolute.133 
 
As it might be noticed, this approach ignores some fundamental theoretical notions pre-
viously discussed in this paper. First of all, it has been submitted from the beginning that 
although the charterer’s safe port obligation is often referred to as a warranty, it does not 
have the same effect. The term warranty does not imply any legal sense, thus it should be 
considered as a synonym to the contractual promise. Secondly, it is well established that 
the contractual promise of the port’s safety is not of the absolute character. Furthermore, 
the charterer’s obligation does not extend to abnormal risks, thus, no responsibility for the 
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consequent loss or damage can be attached to the charterer if such abnormal risks mate-
rialize.  Overall, these facts put in doubt the validity of the absolute knowledge approach.    
	  
4.3.3 The foresight of the port-master  	  
The position that in the test of foreseeability as applied to the prospective safety of the port 
issue should be seen through the port-master prospective is, in fact, closely connected to 
the reasonable charterer approach discussed above. Thus, it is claimed that the reasonably 
informed charterer can estimate only the possibility of the risk of danger, whereas the real 
risk of danger, along with facts and knowledge crucial for establishing the prospective sa-
fety, are known only to the port-master. Hence, in fulfilling his contractual obligation, the 
charterer is expected to contact the port-master, whose foresight on the prospective safety 
has a paramount importance.134 Therefore, it is claimed that the port-master’s perspective 
on the safe port issues should be considered at the first place, as even a reasonably well-
informed charterer cannot obtain all the information needed for assessing the safety of the 
port.135 Hence, the charterer is to rely on the facts provided by the port-master.  
 
The theoretical justification of this notion can be found in David Chong Gek Sian work 
“Revising the safe port”136, but unfortunately, it is the only source known arguing in favor 
of this position. No profound criticism of it has been found in the legal literature either. It 
can be suggested though, that since the reasonable knowledge on the prospective safety 
obtained by the port-master is initially the same knowledge that the reasonable charterer 
can obtain137, it might be enough to consider the foresight of the latter mentioned for the 
application of the foreseeability test. Furthermore, the consideration of the port-master fo-
                                                
 134	  Ibid	  at	  86.	  135	  Ibid.	  136	  David	  Chong	  Gek	  Sian,	  supra	  note	  38.	  137	  As	  suggested	  by	  Ibid.	  
 40 
resight in terms of the port’s prospective safety might unnecessarily complicate the litiga-
tion and lead to very uncertain results.  	  
4.3.4 The foresight of the master of the ship or the shipowner 	  
The role of the shipowner or master seems to be of a great importance due to the fact that 
both in voyage and time charterparty agreements, the owner by means of the master retains 
the control over the vessel.138 That is why, at the first glance, it seems to be reasonable to 
consider the master’s or shipowner’s foresight while applying the test of foreseeability to 
the issues of the port’s prospective safety.139  
 
As it has been mentioned above, the first authority in which the perspective of a reasonable 
master or shipowner was mentioned is Diamond J’s ruling in the Saga Cob. Although, the 
decision was reversed on the appeal140, the House of Lords accepted the importance of rea-
sonable shipowner’s or master’s foresight on estimating the port’s safety. Precisely, Parker 
LJ highlighted that:  
 
“One is considering whether the port should be regarded as unsafe by owners, charterers or 
masters of vessels. It is accepted that this does not mean that it is unsafe unless shown to be 
absolutely safe. It will not, in circumstances such as the present, be regarded as unsafe un-
less the ‘political’ risk is sufficient for a reasonable shipowner or master141 to decline to 
send or sail his vessel there”142.  
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Therefore, even though the contractual obligation to order a ship to a prospectively safe 
port rests on the charterer, the prospective safety should be estimated in accordance with 
the fact whether a reasonable well-informed shipowner or master would agree to proceed to 
the nominated port, having the knowledge of its set-up.143 Hence, pursuant to Parker LJ, if 
there is a risk to a ship, which however, in the view of shipowner or master, does not pre-
sent any danger to her, the risk is accepted by the latter. Consequently, the port will not be 
rendered unsafe within this accepted risk.   
 
The main difficulty that might arise in the present context is that in case of the dispute re-
garding the subsequent liability for damage or loss sustained by the ship as a result of being 
exposed to this accepted risk, the shipowner or the master are to give evidence and justify 
their position as towards what kind of ports they would agree to proceed or not.144 This 
problem is claimed to be resolved similarly to the seaworthiness testimonies that are also 
required from the shipowner. It is submitted that the test of seaworthiness under English 
law frequently relates to the fact whether a reasonable shipowner, that is well-informed that 
the vessel to a certain extent does not meet the requirements for seaworthiness, would agree 
for a voyage.145 However, the courts proved to be able to apply a standard even without the 
evidence produced by the shipowner.146  
 
To sum up, although it seems that the reasonable foreseeability test has been frequently 
followed by the courts, some authors seriously question whether the doctrine in question 
provides an adequate assessment of the port’s perspective safety. Thus, it is submitted that 
the foreseeability test as applied to the port’s safety matters would lead to the practical dif-
ficulties and provide an inconsistent result. This notion seems to be particularly correct in 
the light of the abovementioned discussion on whose foresight is to be chosen, given that in 
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practice, the decision to send a ship to a particular port is usually a calculated risk equally 
estimated by the charterer and shipowner.147  	  
4.4 The Saga Cob criticism 	  
The Saga Cob decision at first instance was frequently criticized in practice. Whereas some 
authorities put in doubt the validity of Diamond J’s submissions per se, others point at the 
inconsistency between the legal reasoning and argumentation provided by the mentioned 
judge and subsequent conclusions he reached.148  
 
To be precise, Diamond J’s attempt to apply the foreseeability doctrine towards the safety 
of the port for some scholars seems to be rather inaccurate from the beginning.149 Thus, the 
underlying agreement to this dispute was the charterparty based on the Shelltime 3 form 
that contained the due diligence obligation towards port safety. However, the clause was 
viewed by the named judge as the one that puts a distinctive line between the warranty of 
safety and the obligation to exercise due diligence.150 Consequently, Diamond J suggested 
that if the vessel was ordered to the port that prospectively was not safe but neither of the 
responsible parties obtained any factual knowledge with that regard, there will be no breach 
of the due diligence obligation on the side of the charter.151 In that vein, the due diligence 
obligation would be breached only when the charterer possessed or ought to possess the 
essential information that the port is prospective unsafe and still ordered the vessel to that 
distention. 
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It is submitted that the wording that the charterer “ought to know” as used by Diamond J 
explicitly calls for the test of reasonable foreseeability, as the matters of which the charterer 
was ought to know are initially those that he could have reasonably foreseen.152 Given that 
the charterparty in the Saga Cob contained the due diligence obligation to nominate a safe 
port, it is unclear how the fulfillment of this contractual obligation can be measured in line 
with the reasonable foreseeability test.  The distinction between the duty to nominate a safe 
port and duty to exercise due diligence regarding such nomination proposed in the Saba 
Cob seems to be rather unclear and ambiguous as well.  
 
Interestingly, on the appeal, Parker J challenged the outcome of the litigation, but did not 
comment on Diamond J’s findings on the test of foreseeability.153 The validity of the test 
was challenged only in The Chemical Venture154 by Gatehouse J. He expressed his rea-
sonable doubts, as to whether the test of safety proposed by Diamond J accords with the 
traditional approach to the matters of the safe port obligation presented in The Eastern Ci-
ty.155 No precise clarification on this submission was made though. 
 
However, the notion that the test of foreseeability contradicts the classic understanding of 
the essence of the contractual obligation in question has found its reflection in legal world. 
Thus, the opponents of the application of the test of foreseeability to the port’s safety issues 
build their argumentation upon the Lord Roskill’s dictum where the term of prospective 
safety has been introduced for the first time. Namely, it is suggested that nothing in The 
Evia No. 2 decision gives a ground to assume that the test of foreseeability is to be used as 
a criterion for anticipating the prospective state of the port.  	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4.5 Did Lord Roskill in his ruling imply the applicability of foreseeability 
doctrine as an appropriate test for the port’s perspective safety?  	  
The proponents of the position that the test of reasonable foreseeability should be applied 
towards the prospective safety issues mainly justify it by the wording used by Lord Roskill 
in his ruling. The main focus was given on the following passage:   	  
“But that contractual promise cannot mean that that port or place must be safe when 
that order is given, for were that so, a charterer could not legitimately give orders to 
go to an ice-bound port which he and the owner both knew in all human probabili-
ty156 would be ice-free by the time that vessel reached it. Nor, were that the nature 
of the promise, could a charterer order the ship to a port or place the approached to 
which were at the time of the order blocked as a result of a collision or by some 
submerged wreck or other obstacles even though such obstacles would in all human 
probability157 be out of the way before the ship required to enter”158  	  	  	  	  	  
As it has already been stressed in this work, this passage was mistakenly understood as the 
one suggesting that the safety of the port should be estimated against the state of knowled-
ge of the charterer and hence, the test of foreseeability is the most reasonable method to 
estimate this knowledge. However, as it is submitted by the opponents of the applicability 
of foreseeability doctrine, the true meaning of the cited notion should be understood in line 
with the subsequent paragraphs.159  
 
Namely, this part of Lord Roskill’s ruling preliminary focuses on the abnormal events and 
the fact that the charterer should be realized from the liability if the damage or loss occurs 
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due to the mentioned reason.160 Hence, the “in all human probabilities” wording by no 
means refers to the state of charterer’s knowledge. Instead, it highlights the distinctions 
between the normal risks to which the vessel is expected to be exposed and those which 
occurrence is impossible to predict “in all human probabilities”.  Although, the following 
passage contains the reference to the perspective safety of the port, the judge does not go 
into further evaluation with that regard. Therefore, it seems to be unreasonable to undertake 
the “in all human probabilities” wording as an implicit suggestion to use the concept of the 
foreseeability in order to establish the prospective safety of the port.  
 
Furthermore, there is nothing in Lord Roskill’s ruling that makes it possible to submit that 
the lack of the charterer’s knowledge is culpable.161 It is not the knowledge possessed by 
the charterer that constitutes the breach of the safe port warranty, but the order to proceed 
to a port.162 The prospective safety of the port in the cited context should not be seen as an 
invitation to apply the test of the foreseeability. Rather, the concept of prospective safety is 
used to highlight the time gap between the time of when the safety of the port should be 
assessed, namely, at the time of the nomination, and the time to which the safe port warran-
ty initially relates, thus to the moment when the vessel actually arrives at the port, stays 
there and leaves it.163  Although prospective safety of the port is assessed upon the facts 
available at the moment of the nomination, the charterer guarantees not the reasonably ex-
pected safe port’s conditions, but the actual safety of the port in the future. In essence, it 
means that the prospective safety of the port is a prediction made by the charterer on the 
basis of the information available to him. 164 
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Although, it might be mistakenly assumed that the prediction of the perspective safety is 
practically the same as the foreseeability, there is a considerable difference between these 
terms.  
 
First of all, the foreseeability is closely connected to reasonability; namely, which port’s 
conditions can reasonably be expected. In contrast, the prediction is a matter of facts resul-
ting in the conclusion of the port’s safety in the future perspective. Further, the concept of 
foreseeability is usually viewed as the tort of negligence, where the standard of care will 
always be the one of prudence and caution.165  In reality, charterer’s obligation to provide a 
safe port usually stems from a contract that can equally impose a higher standard.   
 
Overall, it might be concluded that the application of the test of foreseeability leads to a 
great confusion. The prediction of the port’s safety based on the facts, on the other hand, is 
quite easy and straightforward. To be precise, if the nominated port becomes unsafe fol-
lowing the nomination, the only question to answer is whether the conditions that rendered 
the port unsafe could have been anticipated based on the facts known at the time of the no-
mination.  
 
The distinctive line between the foreseeability of the port’s safety and the prediction on the 
port’s state as towards its safety  seems to be rather tricky, but in fact, this notion was used 
as a benchmark for developing the test that seems to be a fairly precise criterion to estimate 
the prospective safety of the port. 	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4.6 The alternative to the doctrine of foreseeability found in practice 
 
The alternative to the test of reasonable foreseeability was proposed by Bingham J in The 
Lucille at first instance, confirmed on appeal and slightly elaborated in some other cases166.  
 
As a starting point, it should be assumed that the charterer’s obligations regarding the ports 
safety directly relates to the particular characteristics of the port.167 Therefore, Bingham J 
suggests that the matter of prospective safety should be resolved pursuant to the twofold 
test. Thus, it is submitted that rather than assuring whether the certain conditions that ren-
dered port unsafe could have been reasonably expected or not, the court should answer two 
principal questions:  
 
Firstly, it is to be established what the source of the prospective unsafety was.168 Secondly, 
the court is to decided whether the damage or loss sustained by the vessel occurred due to 
the source of the prospective unsafety or due to any other reason that falls outside the char-
terer’s safe port obligation.169   
 
Thus, in the first stage of the test the court would have to consider the inherent characteris-
tics and attributes of the port with the aim to estimate whether the conditions of unsafety 
existed at the time of nomination. Not only the physical state of the port per se should form 
the basis of the court’s consideration, but also the surrounding facts and circumstances.170  
 
It should be stressed again that the crucial time for estimating the port’s safety is the time 
of nomination. If the court agrees that at the time of giving an order to proceed, there was a 
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prospect that the ship would be exposed to a danger stemming from the inherent attributes 
of the port that cannot be avoided by good navigation and seamanship.  
 
Since the court makes its evaluation on the prospective safety of the port on the basis of the 
concrete facts and circumstances, some authors questions whether the charterer’s state of 
knowledge on those facts is of relevance for establishing the breach of safe port warran-
ty.171  
 
The right answer to this question lies in the fact that the safe port obligation in vast majori-
ty of cases is embodied into a contract and thus, should be viewed as a contractual duty of 
the charterer. By signing the charterparty agreement, the charterer is found under the obli-
gation to perform all the duties imposed on him, the safe port warranty included. From this 
perspective, the knowledge that he has or ought to have regarding the perspective safety of 
the port is irrelevant. Unless the charterparty states otherwise, the contractual duty would 
be of a strict character. From this perspective, the knowledge that the charterer has or ought 
to have regarding the perspective safety of the port seems to be irrelevant. The only fact 
that matters then is whether the charterer in essence fulfilled his safe port warranty obligat-
ions or not.    
 
As to the second stage of the test, it should be specified that the mere fact that a vessel was 
ordered to the unsafe port or that loss or damage was sustained there, does not automatical-
ly imply the charterer was in breach of his primary safe port obligation.172 The charterer’s 
undertakings regarding the safe port do not guarantee that a vessel, properly navigated with 
reasonable skill and care, would be absolutely safe in the nominated port.173 Furthermore, 
even if the vessel would be exposed to danger in the port and the higher standards of navi-
gation and seamanship are required, it would not follow automatically that the contractual 
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promise regarding the port’s safety was unfulfilled. The causation link between loss and 
damage sustained by the ship and the unsafety of the port should be established.   
 
Overall, it can be concluded that despite the fact that the The Eastern City and The Evia No. 
2 decision was ruled decades ago, there are still some uncertainties left regarding some 
principal matters of the operating of the safe port warranty. Although, those matters were 
partly resolved in The Evia No. 2 case, there is still place for further specification and 
evaluation. To be precise, Lord Roskill’s decision is silent on how exactly the prospective 
safety of the port should be assessed. There are two main approaches to this problem that 
have been overviewed in the present paper. There are some authors that suggest that the 
prospective safety of the port should be viewed in line with the doctrine of foreseeability. 
The proponents of this idea stress that the matters of prospective safety are determined of 
the concrete facts and therefore, the estimation of the prospective safety is a prediction ma-
de on the basis of factual determination. It should be noted that very few legal decisions 
deal with that matter in depth, although the importance of the matter in question is well 
recognizable.  
 
This is particularly applicable to the matters of the prospective safety of the port that by so 
far have not formed the subject of deep judicial analysis. Very few cases are known that 
address this problem, but within them the matters of prospective safety are only briefly 
overviewed without any further deep evaluation.  	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5 Subsequent unsafety of the port and secondary obligation of 
the charterer regarding the safe port warranty  	  
As it has been numerously mentioned, the charterer’s safe port warranty does not extend to 
the situations of the abnormal character. However, the essence of the safe port warranty is 
underpinned by the idea that the time charterer should make everything in his power to 
assure the safety of the ship at the port and to protect her from any further arising danger.174 
Thus, if an unexpected event took place that rendered or would render the port unsafe, the 
time charterer would usually be found under the obligation to cancel his primary order and 
to direct the vessel to another port. This subsequent order is known as the secondary obli-
gation to nominate a safe port.  
 
There is a certain limitation to the secondary obligation towards the safe port nomination 
though. Thus, the charterer is not required to re-nominate a port if the vessel is not able to 
comply with the new voyage order, for example, when the vessel has already reached the 
nominated port and it is impossible for her to leave it.175 Apart from this exception, the 
failure to re-nominate the port in case of the subsequent unsafety of the first nomination 
would constitute the breach of the contract resulting in damages.176  
 
In essence, the basic observations on the operation of the primary safe port obligation, that 
are made in the first chapter of this work, are equally applicable to the secondary safe port 
obligation imposed on the charterer. Namely, the charterer is to redirect the ship to a 
prospectively safe port that is to be determined at the time when such order is given.177  
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The need to fulfill the secondary obligation to nominate a safe port can cause some additio-
nal difficulties, in case the charterer had also entered into sub-chartering  or bill of lading 
agreements.178 The possible solution for the charterer would be to include protective clau-
ses to the abovementioned agreements that would tackle the question of his subsequent 
liability.  
 
Since the time charterer is the one responsible for the employment of the ship, the second-
ary obligation to nominate a safe port generally causes no technical difficulties, apart from 
the effect such nomination might have on third parties. However, the questions arises 
whether the scheme of perspective safety and the further secondary obligation towards it, 
as explained by Lord Roskill, can operate successfully when the voyage charterer parties 
are to be considered.179  Although this problem was mentioned in The Evia No. 2, Lord 
Roskill abstained from giving this issue a deep consideration. 180 
 
As it has been noted, one of the main distinctive features between time and voyage charter-
parties is that the time charterer is responsible for the employment of the ship, so that the 
redirection of the ship should present no major difficulty, apart from the effect such re-
direction might have on third parties.181 On the other hand, the voyage charterparty is 
usually fixed from the beginning. The ports of loading and discharge are generally written 
down in the agreement and constitute the binding term of the contract. It is practically im-
possible to draw a parallel between specified and nominated ports under voyage charterer 
and ports to which the ship is ordered by the time charterer. Therefore, at the first place, it 
might be rather problematic to make a fair comparison between of how the analysis of the 
safe port warranty made by Lord Roskill in The Evia No. 2 is applicable to the voyage 
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charterparty agreements. The examination of this problem would be provided in the fol-
lowing sub-chapter of the present work.  	  
5.1 The safe port obligation and the voyage charterparty agreements  	  
In the traditional or simple voyage charterparty, that is, roughly speaking, is a voyage from 
port A to port B, the charterer has no right to nominate the port and to supervise its safety.  
However, the modern trade has called for the flexibility of the voyage charterparties.182 The 
reason for that lies in the fact that in vast majority of cases, the voyage charterparty 
agreement is not merely a contract of affreightment, but one of the integral elements of the 
international contract of sail concluded on the shipment terms.183 In essence, it means that 
the voyage charterparty is stemming from the contract of sale which has a dominant posi-
tion: the transporting agreement would be framed in a way that enables the charterer to 
fulfill his obligations under the sale contract.  
 
The flexibility of the voyage charterparties, among others, relates to the ports of loading 
and discharge, or the places of loading and discharge within the concrete ports. This has 
been reflected in contemporary standard voyage charterparty terms that frequently give a 
voyage charterer a right to nominate a port. This right is rather unusual for “classic” voyage 
charterparties.184 Although such flexibility gives a positive impact on the business efficien-
cy, it also imposes the additional obligations on the parties to the voyage charter.185 To be 
precise, once the voyage charterer obtains the right to nominate a port, he has to make sure 
that this port is a safe one. Therefore, the concept of the primary safe port obligation is also 
known in terms of voyage charterers.  
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The analysis of legal literature shows that when it comes to the nature of the safe port war-
ranty in terms of the voyage charterparty agreement, it basically remains the same, as in the 
time charters.186 Thus, the voyage charterer should be found under the contractual promise 
to nominate the port that is prospectively safe for the vessel to approach, use and depart 
from it.187 The crucial time for the assessing the port’s safety is at the time when the nomi-
nation is made.188  
 
The peculiarity of a voyage charterparty agreement, as opposed to time charterers, is that 
once the port is nominated and written down in the contract, it becomes a bounding term of 
the contract and is seen as irrevocable and operating retroactively, provided that such no-
mination is valid.189 The situation is even more simplified in terms of a traditional voyage 
charterer, when there is only single port of loading and discharge stipulated with no right 
for the charterer to order the vessel elsewhere. Therefore, it is highly debatable whether the 
secondary obligation of the charterer to nominate another port in case of unsafety occurred 
after the first nomination exists in the voyage charterparties.     Nevertheless, the position 
that the voyage charterer has the right of re-nomination appears in the legal literature190 and 
thus, provides a room for the discussion.  
	  
5.2 Should the voyage charterer should be granted a right to re-nominate 
the port?  
 
Although the specified nature of the voyage charterparty agreements makes it illogical to 
suggest that the secondary obligation towards the safe port warranty exists within the voya-
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ge charter ambit, legal authority known declares the opposite. To be precise, in the case 
The Teutonia191 the possibility to renominate the port under the voyage charterparty was 
recognized. At the case at hand, the nominated port was rendered unsafe due to the out-
break of the war. The Privy Council decided that the right of re-nomination should be 
granted, since the contractual obligations were fulfilled by the parties and thus, the effort to 
give the effect to that contract should be made, as it would be at least unfair to leave the 
shipowner without the freight paid.192 The freight was ruled to be paid upon the delivery to 
the nearby port that was to be chosen by the shipowner, rather than the charterer.  
 
The abovementioned ruling has been numerously criticized as the one that contradicts the 
nature of the voyage charterparties. Thus, in The Vancouver Strike193, Sellers LJ submitted 
in The Teutonia does not provide any true legal reasoning of the decision and therefore, 
hardly can be reliable.194 
 
The existence of secondary obligation towards the safe port warranty was also challenged 
in The Jasmine B195, where Diamond J strongly disagreed with the position expressed in 
The Teutonia.  Thus, the mentioned judge stressed out the retrospective effect that the no-
mination of the port has in the voyage charterparty and specified that due to this reason the 
charterer has neither a right nor an obligation of the secondary nomination in case of the 
port’s unsafety.196  
 
The Teutonia was also commented on in the famous The Evia No. 2, where Lord Roskill 
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draw attention to the fact that at the time when the formerly mentioned case “was decided 
long before the doctrine of frustration of [of a contract] assumed its modern form”197.  
 
Although, Lord Roskill restrained from giving any direct answer on whether the secondary 
obligation exists in terms of the voyage charters, he gave a hint of alternatives that can be 
used by the parties to this agreement. Thus, Lord Roskill mentioned that the possibility to 
re-direct the vessel to another safe port can be embodied into ice or war clauses of the 
discussed agreements.198 
 
There are also other alternatives that give the parties to the voyage charterparties an option 
to nominate another port in case of the subsequent unsafety of the first nomination. For 
instance, the parties can agree on the delivery of the goods to the nominated port “or as 
near as she can safely get” with the effect that in case a port of the primary nomination is 
not reachable, the goods can be delivered at the nearest port.199  
 
If there is nothing in the voyage charterparty that gives the charterer an option to redirect 
the vessel, the shipowner will face a difficult choice of whether to proceed to the port and 
expose the ship to the danger, or to frustrate the charterparty and by these means to seek a 
relief from his contractual obligation.200  
 
As a matter of general knowledge, it is to note that even in case of frustration of the con-
tract, there still a potential solution to earn a freight and get the goods delivered. If the 
merits of the case make it possible, the parties to the frustrated voyage charter might be 
advised to enter into a new agreement in order to deliver the goods at the alternative port.201 
Another option for the parties would be to nominate the shipowner or the master to be an 
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agent of necessity for the charterer.202 It is to note though, that these options are available 
only upon the frustration of the voyage charterparty. Therefore, it seem to be reasonable to 
accept that no secondary obligation relating to the safe port nomination exists under the 
voyage charterparty agreement.  
 
As it can be seen from above, there are numerous possibilities available to the parties wit-
hin the voyage charterparty contract that can tackle the problem of unsafety of the port oc-
curring after the nomination. Some authors view these alternatives as an implicit indication 
that the secondary obligation to nominate a safe port known under the time charters does 
not exist in the voyage charterparty agreements.203  
 
Overall, on the basis of abovementioned it can be concluded that hardly can the concept of 
safe port warranty as it is known in the time charterparty agreement operate in the same 
way as in the voyage charteparty agreement. The general understanding of the safe port and 
the essence of the promise to nominate a port that is prospectively safe for the vessel is the 
same in voyage and time charterers. Once the right to nominate the port arises, the obliga-
tion to nominate a safe one is expressly or implicitly attached to it.204 Hence, as far the pri-
mary contractual obligation in question is considered, the same categories are operating in 
charterparties. Probably, it is the only parity that can be detected in the operation of the safe 
port warranty in the time and voyage charterparty agreements.  
 
When it comes to the secondary obligation to nominate another safe port due to the un-
safety of the first nomination, the submissions made by Lord Roskill can be related only to 
the time charterparties. Since the port nomination in the voyage charters has the irrevocable 
and retrospective effect, it seems to be rather difficult to find a voyage charterer under the 
further obligation to re-nominate a port, if the firstly nominated port is rendered unsafe.   
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However, the difficulty that might be caused by the subsequent unsafety of the port in the 
voyage charterparties can be solved by the sensible construction of the terms of the con-
tract. For instance, the parties might be advised not to stipulate an absolute obligation re-
garding the nomination port, but to agree on “as near as the vessel may safely get”205 term 
or to embody the right to make a secondary nomination in ice or war clauses.  
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6 Conclusion  
The present paper aimed at analysing the core issues of the safe port warranty in terms of 
charterparty agreement. It has been established that traditionally, the right to nominate a 
port was a time charterer prerogative. However, the needs of modern trade called for the 
flexibility of the voyage charters, so that the right to nominate a port has also been 
recognised in terms of voyage charterers.  
  
The right to nominate a port triggers the obligation to ensure that the port is safe for the 
ship to call at, stay as long as needed and to leave in a due course. This obligation is known 
as the safe port warranty, although the word “warranty” in present context should be under-
stood as synonym to a “promise”.  
 
What is understood under the safe port undertakings formed the first part of this work. 
Thus, the nature of the safe port warranty is revealed in The Eastern City by Sellers LJ. His 
definition in mentioned case is considered to be a classic passage on the nature of the safe 
port. In his ruling he provides a threefold test of how the safety of the port should be de-
termined. Thus, “… a port will not be safe unless, in the relevant period of time, the parti-
cular ship can reach it, use it and return from it without, in the absence of some abnormal 
occurrence, being exposed to danger which cannot be avoided by good navigation and 
seamanship”206. 
 
The test is pretty simple, but nevertheless quite accurate for understanding the meaning of 
the safe port. However, it does not specify the very important issues, such as where the 
breach of the safe port warranty lies and at what time the safety of the port should be esti-
mated.  
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These questions constituted the second part of the present work. The answers to these is-
sues can be found in the groundbreaking The Evia No. 2 case. There it was established that 
the breach of the warranty lies in giving the order to proceed to a port. As about the time 
when the safety of the port should be estimated, the time of the nomination of the port is of 
the vital importance. Precisely, at the time of nomination the charterer has to estimate the 
prospective safety of the port. Thus, the prospective safety is seen of a vital importance for 
estimating whether the charterer has fulfilled his contractual obligation towards the safe 
port on the moment of nomination.  
 
Though the term “prospective safety” was introduced by the Lord Roskill in the Evia No. 2, 
the mentioned decisino contatins no specification on how it should be determined. There 
are two positions found in the legal literature: the first is that the prospective safety should 
be estimated in accordance with the test of foreseeability; the second approach is that the 
prospective safety is a matter of actual fact since it relates to the actual state of the port at 
the time when the vessel would approach the nominated port. In other words, ,the estima-
tion of the prospective safety is a prediction made by the charterer on the basis of factual 
determination.  
 
The third issue addressed in the present paper related to the safe port warranty as it operates 
in the voyage charterparty agreements. Precisely, it has been questioned whether the no-
tions on the primary and secondary obligation to nominate a safe port could operate in con-
text of voyage charterer. It has been concluded that whereas the primary obligation to no-
minate the port is practically the same, provided that the voyage charterer has a right to 
nominate under the contract, the existence of the secondary obligation is put in doubt. This 
is explained by the fact that the nomination of the port in the voyage charterparty has an 
irrevocable and restrospective effect, meaning that once the nomination of the port is made, 
it is treated as a binding term that existed from the moment of the contract was signed. 
Hence, it logically follows that no-renomination of the port cannot be done within the same 
agreement, unless the other clauses of it, such as ice or war clauses, give a charterer such 
discretion.  
 60 
 
Overall, it should be noted that the issues of safe port warranty present a great interest, but 
yet have not formed a subject of any deep legal evaluation neither in academic works nor in 
the case law. This work has made an attempt to fill in this gap.  
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